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INTRODUCTION
  The Principle of Compositionality (briefly, Compositionality) means that the 
meaning of a complex expression isa function of the meanings of its constituent parts. 
Philosophers and linguists who support he "naive theory" or extensionality in semantics 
think that Compositionality holds. Moreover, Compositionality seems to be supported 
by the Learnability of languages. 
   However, it has been said that Compositionality fails in some contexts: Frege's 
Hesperus-Phosphorus p zzle is a famous example of this failure. Compositionality s 
also said to fail in attitudes sentences, which describe so called "propositional ttitudes". 
  But simply arguing that Compositionality holds or does not hold does not explain 
the important points about Compositionality. What do we mean by Compositionality? 
And what do we mean by the success or failure of Compositionality? These issues are 
discussed inthis paper, mainly by presenting Hintikka's careful and critical examination 
of Compositionality. Although most of my own argument is indebted to Hintikka's, 
my conclusion is not the same as his. It seems to me that Compositionality in which 
component meanings are considered in the context of the whole expression holds in 
natural languages.
- 61 -
COMPOSITIONALITY BASED ON LEARNABILITY
   One of the most important and strongest supporting arguments for 
Compositionality is probably the argument from the Learnability of natural languages. 
I will begin by presenting the argument from Learnability that was first suggested by 
Davidson, and later reconstructed by Hintikka.1 
   We must learn to use natural languages. According to Davidson, a necessary 
feature of a learnable language is that we can give a constructive account of the 
meaning of the sentences in the language. Correspondingly a theory of meaning of 
natural languages must be able to give a constructive account of the meaning of the 
sentences in the language? 
   In our language learning, there are some conditions. One is that we must be able 
to define a predicate of expressions, based solely on their formal properties, that picks 
out the class of meaningful expressions (sentences). Another is that we must be able to 
specify, in a way that depends effectively and solely on formal considerations, what 
every sentence means.3 
   And, if weregard the meaning of each sentence as a function of a finite number of 
features of the sentence, we can understand what there is to be learned, and also how 
an infinite aptitude can be encompassed by finite accomplishments. So if we call an 
expression a semantical primitive, provided the rules which give the meaning for the 
sentences in which it does not appear do not suffice to determine the meaning of the 
sentences in which it does appear, then a learnable language has a finite number of 
semantical primitives.4 
   Davidson's main purpose in this part of the paper is to arrive to the conclusion 
that a learnable language has a finite number of semantical primitives. Another 
conclusion is that Tarski's truth theory is one of the most successful accounts of 
1 There is also support from 
extensionality, but Hintikka thinks that Compositionality 
and extensionality have no relation (Theories of Truth and Learnable Languages, 49-50). 
2 Theories of Meaning and Learnabl
e Languages, 3. 
3 ibid., 7-8. 
4 ibid., 8-9. 
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  meaning that is compatible with several conditions of languagelearning. These 
  considerations of Davidson's seem natural, but they are not formal arguments.
     Now let's return to Compositionality. There are important steps from the 
  Learnability of languages to a recursive type of truth-conditional semantics. In these 
  steps, Compositionality seems to be "the mediating link" between Learnabilityand a 
  recursive truth theory. Let's closely follow the steps from Learnability to 
  Compositionality, as they are reconstructed by Hintikka 5 The sequence is the 
 following: 
  0. Languages must be learnable. 
  1. The meaning of a given complex expression, say E, can be gathered from a finite 
  number of clues in E. 
  2. These clues have to be syntactical, based either on the vocabulary of E or else on the 
  structure of E. 
  3. In this sense, the meaning of E is a function of the contributions of its several 
  constituent components or parts. 
  4. But such a contribution of a constituent part e to the meaning of the larger whole 
  can safely be identified with its "meaning", the meaning of e. 
  5. Hence the meaning of the whole is determined by the meanings of its components 
 (Compositionality holds). 
     The crucial stepis from 3 to 4, where contributions of components and meanings 
  of components are identified. To secure this step, we may need a principle; forexample, 
  a word or other simple grammatical constituent has meaning only in a context. Moreover, 
  there are several points to be considered concerning this. What do we thinkabout the 
  meaning of a component of a complex expression? What do we think about the 
  contribution of a component to the meaning of a complex expression? To answer 
  s Theories of Truth and Learnable Languages
, 38. 
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these questions, let's return to our starting point, the definitions of Compositionality.
             DEFINITIONS OF COMPOSITIONALITY 
   Simply put, Compositionality means that the meaning of a complex expression is
a function of the meanings of its constituent parts. But what is meant by "function" or 
"the meanings of its constituent parts"? 
   First, let's consider "the meanings of its constituent parts". According to Hintikka, 
there seem to be two definitions of Compositionality:6 
Definition 1: The meanings of the component parts el, e2, ..., ei of a complex expression 
E, considered inisolation, determine the meaning of E. 
Definition 2: The meanings of the component parts el, e2, ..., ei of a complex expression 
E, considered inE, determine the meaning of E. 
  These two definitions of Compositionality are the same for the most part, but 
differ on a crucial point. The difference is between "considered in isolation" and 
"considered inE (a complex expression)". In definition 1, the meanings ofthe component 
parts of the complex expression are considered in isolation, so there it must be 
presupposed that the meaning of an expression isthe same in any context, and that 
meaning in isolation is always possible.... This definition reflects a naive understanding 
of Compositionality. 
   In definition 2, on the other hand, the meanings of the component parts of the 
complex expression are considered in the whole complex expression. According to 
Hintikka, the presupposition that the meaning of an expression is the same in any 
context is also required. Frege's Compositionality s an example of this definition, and 
in addition to this definition, another principle concerning meanings must be 
6 ibid., 50. 
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presupposed. The totality of Frege's Compositionality is as follows. 
Main principle: The meaning of a complex expression is a function of the meaning of 
its constituent parts. 
Supplementary principle: A word or other simple grammatical constituent has meaning 
only in a context. 
   But Compositionality in definition 2 with this supplementary principle may not 
be adequate. Definition 2 has a different kind of problem, and probably this definition 
is not a genuine one. The problem is that the meaning of "contribution" may become 
obscure, that is, there seems to be two kinds of contribution. One is direct contribution 
and the other is indirect contribution. I will return to this in the final section.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST COMPOSITIONALITY
   In this section, I will present the arguments against Compositionality given by 
Hintikka. Hintikka's aim is not only to argue for the failure of Compositionality, but 
also to argue for the failure of recursive truth-conditional semantics and to allude to 
the priority of game-theoretical semantics. However, since we are now considering 
the problem of the validity of Compositionality, I will focus only on the first of Hintikka s 
arguments. 
   Hintikka's criticism consists of two parts. First, he insists that Learnability alone 
does not make Compositionality very natural. Additional presuppositions are necessary 
to conclude Compositionality from Leamability. Second, Hintikka gives several 
examples in which Compositionality does not hold because of the lack of additional 
presuppositions (mainly the context-independence thesis and the determinacy thesis). 
The necessary additional presuppositions are the following.' 
 Theories of Truth and Learnable Languages, 40-42. 
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(a) context-independence thesis: 
The meaning of an expression must not depend on the context in which it occurs.
(b) inside-out principle: 
The proper direction of semantical analysis is from inside out in a sentence or other 
complex expression. 
(c) parallelism thesis: 
Syntactical and semantical rules operate in tandem.
(d) invariance thesis: 
When E is formed from certain simpler strings e1, e2, ..., e. these very expressions will 
become "parts" (constituent expressions) of E.
(e) determinacy thesis: 
The meaning of E must be completely determined by the meanings of the expressions 
El, E2, ..., E, from which it is constructed.
   Because the relations between the above presuppositions are not so clear in 
Hintikka's paper, they must be considered here. First, Learnability must be 
supplemented with the context-independence thesis to conclude that Compositionality 
holds. Second, the context-independence thesis i  considered as a variant of the inside-out 
principle, that is, the inside-out principle presupposes the context-independence thesis. 
Third, the parallelism thesis with the invariance thesis, the determinacy thesis and 
some other theses (not mentioned here) make the inside-out principle hold. Fourth, the 
Learnability of languages presupposes the parallelism thesis. Fifth, the inside-out 
principle implies Compositionality. 
   Consideringall of these points, we can conclude:
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Learnability, (d) the invariance thesis, (e) the determinacy thesis and some other theses 
conjointly imply (b) the inside-out principle (from points 3 and 4 above).
  Hintikka does not explicitly state that the inside-out principle implies 
Compositionality (point 5 above). According to his main argument,8 the inside-out 
principle seems to supplement Learnability to imply Compositionality. But this relation 
is not so explicit. In his illustration of the relations of these theses and this principle, 
there is no place for the inside-out principle, but there is a place for Compositionality. 
The content of the principle seems to say the same thing as Compositionality, but 
from a different point of view. If the inside-out principle is the same as Compositionality, 
or if it implies Compositionality, then:
Learnability, (e) the determinacy thesis and some other theses conjointly imply 
Compositionality (from point 5 above).
Learnability, (a) the context-independence thesis, (e) the determinacy thesis and some 
other theses conjointly imply Compositionality (from points 1 and 2).
   If these theses and principles are related in this way, and if some of these theses 
are not actually correct, as Hintikka argues in this paper,9 then Compositionality 
does not hold in natural languages.
CRITICAL COMMENTS
   In this part, I will try to say something against Hintikka's view. It seems to me 
that the context-independence thesis and the invariance thesis are not necessary for 
Compositionality, and that the spirit of the inside-out principle is not necessary for 
8 ibid
., 40. 
9 ibid ., 43-49.
- 67 -
Compositionality either. 
   Concerning the context-independence thesis: Is the context-independence thesis 
necessary for the success of Compositionality? Hintikka's account is that if the meaning 
of e (a component expression) varies in each context, hen the contribution of e cannot 
be determined. This consideration seems to come from the spirit of the inside-out 
thesis. Even without he context-independence thesis, we can determine the contribution 
of e by context. Hintikka's rejection seems to arise from his insistence that determination 
of a context must be done outside-in. But is that really true? If a context is given only 
from a grammatical structure, then the inside-out thesis holds without problem. 10 
   Concerning the invariance thesis: Complex functions also act as simple functions. 
Each contribution may not be "direct", but it contributes tothe meaning of E in some 
definite way. I will return to this in the final section. 
   Then what theses and principles are required by Compositionality? I do not think 
that Compositionality s completely deduced from any thing else, but I think that, at 
least, the determinacy thesis and the parallelism thesis are required for Learnability. 
   Concerning the determinacy thesis: Compositionality worthy of the name must 
satisfy the constraint of the determinacy thesis." I also think that this thesis can be 
extended without dismissing the parallelism thesis. That is: the meaning of E must be 
completely determined by the meanings of the expressions El, E2, ..., E, from which it 
is constructed and also by the structural features of E. 
   Concerning the inside-out principle: As I argued above, Hintikka probably thinks 
that the inside-out principle is the same as Compositionality, or that it implies 
Compositionality. But the spirit of Compositionality s not the same as the spirit of the 
inside-out principle in a rigid sense. It seems that Compositionality without he spirit 
of the inside-out principle is possible, even without dismissing the parallelism thesis. 
The contributions of the parts of a complex sentence must be definite, but if the 
contributions are syntactical, the contributions eed not immediately come from inside
10 If a context isalso given from the meaning of the whole expression
, then the inside-out 
thesis cannot hold. 
" Crimmins, Talk About Beliefs, 9.
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the parts. If the outside-in contributions used in determining the meanings of parts of 
a complex expression are syntactical, we can safely construct the meaning of the 
expression. In this case, it is appropriate to say that Compositionality is in the spirit of 
syntactical-constructivity rather than the inside-out principle.
COMPOS1TIONALITY IN DEFINITION 2
   Finally, what can we think about Compositionality, and does it hold in natural 
languages? I think that definition 2 is good enough as a definition of Compositionality, 
and that it holds without supplementary theses such as the context-independence 
thesis, the invariance thesis and the inside-out principle in a rigid sense. Hintikka's 
two criticisms about definition 2 of Compositionality, and my arguments against them 
are as follows: '
(1) Even if meanings in isolation are prohibited, meanings in context can vary, so 
"there would not be any such thing as the contribution of e to the respective meanings 
of the different complex expressions in which e can occur."" 
But, I think there is no problem in varying the contribution of e to each complex 
expression. The important thing is that we can determine the contribution. Then how 
can we do this? 
In a rigid sense, syntactical-constructivity and the inside-out principle are different 
things. The inside-out principle states that the proper direction of semantical analysis 
is from inside out in a sentence or other complex expression. But this is not necessary 
to construct he meaning syntactically. 
(2) "It is not clear, however, that we can always speak of the meanings within the 
context," as the meanings in isolation. 
For example, if the invariance principle fails, "then the meanings of E might be 
12 Theories of Truth and Learnable Languages, 39. 
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determined by the meanings of certain other expressions e'1, e'2, ..., e', obtainable from 
e1, e2, ..., e1 and E. Then the procedure for determining the meaning of E might turn 
completely on the meanings of e'1, e'2, ..., eli and hence bypass e1, e2, ..., e, altogether. In 
such circumstances it might be nonsense to speak of the respective meanings of e1, e2, 
  e1 in the context E."13 
But, how can we bypass e1, e2, ..., e; altogether? Even if the invariance principle fails, e'1 
= e'1(el, e2, ..., er E), e'2 = e'2(el, e2, ..., of E), .... So we cannot bypass the original simple 
expressions altogether. Of course it remains a problem that e'1, e'2, ..., e', are also 
determined by E. This may cause the failure of the inside-out principle.
   Even if Hintikka's criticism about definition 2 is not justified, there is a further 
argument ofDavidson against Frege's Compositionality. According toDavidson, Frege's 
treatment ofbelief sentences does not satisfy the condition that a learnable anguage 
has a finite number of semantical primitives." The main reason is that there is no 
theory which interprets he new expressions (expressions for senses, introduced after 
the appearances of verbs like 'believes') as logically structured. But is there really no 
systematic way of constructing meanings of parts? For example, if we think of the 
contribution of a part as a compound of its usual meaning and its structure, then we 
can systematically introduce a new expression of this contribution. And Davidson's 
own resolution i  "On Saying That" does not seem to present any logical interpretation 
of 'that' in relation to succeeding expressions.
13 ibid ., 51. 
14 Theories of Me
aning and Learnable Languages, 14.
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On the Principle of Compositionality
Takeshi SOEJIMA
 Philosophers and linguists who support thenaive theory or extensionality in semantics 
think that Compositionality holds. Moreover, Compositionality seems to be supported by 
the Learnability of languages. But many philosophers have argued that Compositionality 
fails in some contexts by many philosophers. 
 Now simply arguing that Compositionality holds or does not does not explain the 
important point about Compositionality. What do we mean by Compositionality? And 
what do we mean by the success or failure of Compositionality? These issues are discussed 
in this paper by presenting Hintikka's careful and critical examination of Compositionality. 
The author thinks that Compositionality in which component meanings are considered in 
the context of the whole expression holds in natural languages.
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